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Background: Response to the 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in Sierra 
Leone overwhelmed the national capacity to contain it and necessitated a massive 
international response and strong coordination platform. Consequently, the Sierra Leone 
Government, with support of the international humanitarian community, established and 
implemented various models for national coordination of the outbreak. In this article, we 
review the strengths and limitations of the EVD outbreak response coordination systems 
in Sierra Leone and propose recommendations for improving coordination of similar 
outbreaks in the future.
conclusion: There were two main frameworks used for the coordination of the out-
break; the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and the National Ebola Response Center 
(NERC). We observed an improvement in outbreak coordination as the management 
mechanism evolved from the EOC to the NERC. Both coordination systems had their 
advantages and disadvantages; however, the NERC coordination mechanism appeared 
to be more robust. We identified challenges, such as competition and duplication of 
efforts between the numerous coordination groups, slow resource mobilization, inad-
equate capacity of NERC/EOC staff for health coordination, and an overtly centralized 
coordination and decision-making system as the main coordination challenges during 
the outbreak.
recommendations: We recommend the establishment of EOCs with simple inci-
dent management system-based coordination prior to outbreaks, strong government 
leadership, decentralization of coordination systems, and functions to the epicenter of 
outbreaks, with clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities between different levels, 
regular training of key coordination leaders, and better community participation as meth-
ods to improve coordination of future disease outbreaks.
Keywords: ebola virus disease, outbreak response, coordination, incident management system, sierra Leone
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iNtrODUctiON
With a total of 14,122 suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, 
and 3,955 deaths in all 14 health districts, the 2014–2015 Ebola 
virus disease (EVD) outbreak in Sierra Leone was the single larg-
est in the history of the disease (1). The magnitude of the outbreak 
overwhelmed the national capacity to contain it and necessitated 
a massive international response, which included several dozen 
national and international partners with various mandates, 
interests, and comparative advantages (2, 3). During the initial 
response, similar to Guinea and Liberia, the other two principally 
affected countries, the effectiveness of the response was limited 
by several factors such as the magnitude of the outbreak, poor 
capacity for response and risk communication, ineffective coor-
dination, weak health systems, and community resistance (4–6).
Involvement of numerous national and international partners 
in the outbreak response necessitated the establishment of a strong 
EVD outbreak response coordination platform. In response to 
this, the Sierra Leone Government, with support from the inter-
national humanitarian community, established and implemented 
various frameworks for the national coordination of the outbreak 
from July 2014 until November 2015 (7), when the outbreak was 
officially declared over. These frameworks aimed to address the 
different outbreak coordination needs, including command and 
control mechanisms for a multisectoral response; cross-border 
coordination of epidemic response interventions; development, 
implementation, and supervision of unified outbreak control 
guidelines at national and sub-national levels; effective commu-
nication between national and district response operations and 
between the different EVD response components, partners, and 
with the community.
Health coordination aims to ensure a coordinated and effective 
approach to emergency health program planning, implementa-
tion, supervision, and monitoring. It plays a critical role in ensur-
ing available resources are effectively deployed and used, activities 
are well planned and synchronized and complement each other 
so that any gaps in the response operation are efficiently identified 
and resolved (8). Outbreak response requires strong and effective 
national leadership and coordination frameworks. This becomes 
more challenging and complicated during a vast outbreak like the 
EVD in West Africa that involved multiple stakeholders, some of 
which have limited technical knowledge and capabilities.
During our time supporting the outbreak response in Sierra 
Leone (please see the Section “Author Notes” for the roles of 
the authors in the coordination of the outbreak), we observed 
several positive features that facilitated effective coordination. 
Conversely, we also noted some barriers that may have delayed 
effective control of the outbreak. In this article, we identify 
the strengths and weaknesses of the EVD outbreak response 
coordination frameworks in Sierra Leone and propose a number 
of recommendations for improving the coordination of future 
outbreak responses.
OrGANiZAtiON OF tHe NAtiONAL  
evD cOOrDiNAtiON sYsteM iN  
sierrA LeONe
There were two main periods and coordination frameworks for 
the EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone. From July to September 2014, 
an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) was used as the coordi-
nation model, whereas from October 2014 until the end of the 
outbreak, the Sierra Leone Government established a command 
and control style incident management system (IMS), called 
the National Ebola Response Center (NERC), to coordinate the 
outbreak.
the eOc coordination system
Under the EOC coordination framework, three main EVD coor-
dination groups, a national EOC, a Presidential task force, and 
a national EVD task force, were established at the national level 
(Figure 1). The national EOC was responsible for coordinating 
the operational and technical aspects of the outbreak response. 
This included operational planning, implementation, supervision, 
coordination, and monitoring and had six technical components; 
coordination, surveillance, and laboratory; case management; 
social mobilization; logistics; and psychosocial care/social 
protection. In addition to these components there was an Alert 
Call Center, which facilitated coordination of all community 
alerts. The EOC operated under the administrative authority of 
the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) and was chaired 
by the Minister for Health/Chief Medical Officer (CMO) until 
the end of August 2014, when an Operations Coordinator was 
appointed by the Head of State. The CMO became solely respon-
sible for coordination of the technical aspects, while overall 
administrative management of EOC was under the control of 
the Operations Coordinator. The national EOC reported to the 
Presidential taskforce through an inter-ministerial committee.
A Presidential EVD task force, chaired by the Head of State, 
provided overall policy, strategic, and political direction for 
the outbreak response. An inter-ministerial committee, which 
included relevant cabinet ministers, heads of relevant multilateral 
agencies such as the United Nations (UN) and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and bilateral partners such 
as US Centers for Disease Prevention and Control and Public 
Health England, oversaw implementation of the decisions of the 
Presidential task force. A national EVD task force was also estab-
lished, with the aim of involving a broader spectrum of national, 
district, and community stakeholders in the EVD response. In 
reality, this task force, which only met on a few occasions, did not 
function effectively.
At the district level, the EOC coordination structure (district 
Ebola task forces) comprised five technical components; coordi-
nation; epidemiology/surveillance/laboratory; case management/ 
infection control; social mobilization/psychosocial support; and 
logistics. The district task forces were chaired by the district 
Abbreviations: CMO, chief medical officer; DERC, District Ebola Response 
Center; DHMT, District Health Management Team; EOC, Ebola Operations 
Center; IMS, incident management system; i-PACT, Inter-pillar Action and 
Coordination Team; MOHS, Ministry of Health and Sanitation; NERC, National 
Ebola Response Center; NGO, Non-Governmental Organization; SEOCC, Sub-
Regional Ebola Operation Coordinating Center; UN, United Nations; UNMEER, 
United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response.
FiGUre 1 | schematic diagram of the ebola Operations center (eOc), sierra Leone: June–september, 2014. Abbreviations: EOC, Ebola Operations 
Center; SEOCC, Sub-Regional Ebola Operation Coordinating Center.
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council Chairmen, who organized daily meetings; each technical 
group also met on a daily basis. The coordination component 
included the leads for all the technical components, and discus-
sions in these meetings were similar to those of the district task 
force meetings. At the supra-national level, a multiagency body, 
known as the Sub-regional Ebola Operations Coordinating 
Center (SEOCC), based in Conakry, Guinea, which coordinated 
the international and cross-border aspects of the outbreak and 
provided technical support to the national EOCs, was operational 
from June to October 2014.
the Nerc coordination system
The NERC, which succeeded the EOC in October 2014, was more 
sophisticated and incorporated a civil–military cooperative style 
of coordination, with deployment of Sierra Leonean and other 
foreign military personnel to support coordination and operation 
of the EVD response. It was chaired by a Chief Executive Officer 
who reported directly to the Head of State. Under this coordi-
nation framework, the operational and technical aspects of the 
outbreak response were clearly separated, with the establishment 
of a situation room that focused on monitoring the operational 
aspects of the outbreak, and the CMO leading the technical 
aspects, which were similar to the former EOC (Figure 2). The 
technical components continued to play their previous role in the 
outbreak response, although in a restructured form with seven 
components. The Presidential and national EVD task forces con-
tinued to operate without any changes. The NERC was housed in 
the UN Special Court, which had optimal space and equipment 
for its operations.
An Inter-pillar Action and Coordination Team (i-PACT) was 
subsequently established to strengthen leadership and bridge the 
communication gap between the two main NERC groups; the 
situation room and the technical components. Structures similar 
to the NERC, District Ebola Response Centers (DERCs), with dis-
trict Ebola situation rooms and Ebola response components, each 
with a district coordinator, were established at the district level. In 
October 2014, the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency 
Response (UNMEER) replaced the SEOCC. National and district 
offices of UNMEER were established in the three principally 
affected countries in October 2014, each with its own coordinator.
FiGUre 2 | schematic diagram of the National ebola response center (Nerc), sierra Leone: October 2014–November 2015. Abbreviations: DERC, 
District Ebola Response Center; NERC, National Ebola Response Center; i-PACT, Inter-pillar Action and Coordination Team; UNMEER, United Nations Mission for 
Ebola Emergency Response.
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KeY LiMitAtiONs OF tHe evD 
OUtBreAK cOOrDiNAtiON  
sYsteMs iN sierrA LeONe
General Observations
In general, we observed progressive improvements in the 
coordination of the outbreak (7). However, the coordination 
mechanisms remained centralized and top-heavy throughout. 
The EOC structure was simple and less labor-intensive com-
pared to the NERC, with the main focus on technical issues 
and the development of standard operating procedures, with 
little emphasis and limited capacity to support the operational 
activities mainly due to lack of resources and technical know-how 
on emergency operations. This resulted in poor oversight, sup-
portive supervision and monitoring, as well as inadequate links 
between the national and district coordination mechanisms. The 
EOC experienced bureaucratic decision-making, lack of funding, 
and low thresholds for the disbursement of available funds, which 
compromised its ability to effectively coordinate and respond to 
the outbreak. The most likely reason for this was the lack of execu-
tive power on decision-making, which also limited its ability to 
effectively coordinate with other sectors. Furthermore, combin-
ing the operational and technical aspects of the coordination 
5Olu et al. Ebola Outbreak Coordination in Sierra Leone
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org November 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 254
efforts under one coordination structure proved to be challeng-
ing and often overwhelmed the capacity of the EOC. This was 
further compounded by inadequate infrastructure, including lack 
of office space, communication equipment, internet access, and 
limited staffing in the EOC. On the other hand, the NERC had 
far reaching decision-making authority due to its direct report 
to the Head of State. This, together with availability of required 
resources (both financial and human), adequate equipment, and 
space, made its operations more effective.
communication
At the initial implementation stages of the NERC system, there was 
a lack of clarity about the roles, responsibilities, and channels of 
communication between the different coordination groups. This 
was particularly evident with the District Health Management 
Teams (DHMT), which comprised the district EOCs and the 
newly established DERCs. The same situation was experienced 
at the national level, with the technical components operating 
independently from the operational components, without effec-
tive collaboration with the NERC (and the Ebola situation room).
Communication between the operational and technical com-
ponents of the NERC was often suboptimal, at both district and 
national levels. This was mainly because of a lack of understand-
ing of the new coordination mechanism, as no orientation was 
provided on the new mechanisms for civil–military cooperation. 
This often resulted in duplication of efforts and unnecessary 
competition between the two NERC groups (the operation room 
and technical components). This was reflected in the produc-
tion of different technical epidemiological information by both 
groups.
Furthermore, there were at least three EVD coordinators 
at the district level (DERC coordinators, District Medical 
Officers, and UNMEER coordinators) leading to tension and 
conflict over control of the outbreak response. In districts such 
as Bombali, Port Loko, Kambia, and Western Area, foreign 
military personnel were also designated as coordinators, further 
compounding this conflict. Technical meetings were held with 
no clear mechanism for conveying recommendations to the 
main coordinating group. The i-PACT system was established to 
provide technical advice and improve communication between 
the two main coordination groups of the NERC at the national 
level; however, it achieved limited success. There was no direct 
funding to facilitate coordination between national and district 
level technical components.
community engagement
The community was involved in the coordination of the response 
at the district level, through regular participation of the paramount 
Chiefs at daily DERC meetings. This was however, not sufficient to 
obtain the full cooperation of community members on response 
activities such as active case finding, contact tracing, burials, and 
social mobilization. It appeared that the inadequate cooperation 
was because of misconceptions and fear. One of which was the 
perception that the treatment centers represented “points of no 
return”; whoever was taken there was thought not likely to return 
to the community alive. This resulted in community resistance, 
which was a distinct feature of this outbreak (6, 9).
evD response coordination Meetings
During the initial stages of the outbreak, the management of 
some of the coordination meetings was poor; meetings were 
unnecessarily long, and some did not reach any concrete deci-
sions. This was evidenced by poorly prepared minutes and the 
lack of clear mechanisms for follow-up on agreed action points. 
Consequently, there were often delays of several days to weeks 
before action points were implemented. This often resulted in 
apathetic officials, poor attendance, and repeated discussions of 
the same topics.
Many officials were members of multiple technical compo-
nents or coordination groups, and the roles of other officials 
overlapped, resulting in the engagement of some of the key actors 
in frequent and prolonged meetings. For instance, the district 
Ebola task forces and their technical coordination component 
essentially included the same people and discussed the same 
issues. Slight reductions in these challenges were noted under the 
NERC system, which streamlined the number, participation in, 
and duration of coordination meetings. For example, the national 
Ebola situation room met twice a day for a maximum of 1  h. 
Conversely, this led to concerns from some partners about the 
limited time for in-depth discussions of critical issues.
evD information Management
Our observations highlighted multiple EVD information sharing 
channels and situation reports, each conveying different informa-
tion and epidemiological data. This often fueled disagreements 
between partners resulting in poor use of the available data to 
guide the ongoing response. For instance, many stakeholders had 
different data collection guidelines and reporting formats, which 
challenged data aggregation at the national level. This resulted in 
poor coordination of the EVD data collection system and several 
versions of the national EVD database, each of which had its 
own limitations (10). At the later stages of the outbreak, a district 
support and assurance desk was established within the NERC to 
bridge the information gap between the districts and the national 
level and consolidate NERC support to the districts.
evD resource Mobilization and 
Disbursement
We observed that weak coordination of the mobilization, and 
deployment of the resources required for the EVD outbreak 
response was one of the most critical challenges for effective 
control of the outbreak, particularly during the early phases. 
The logistical components were unable to estimate or quantify 
available logistics, supplies, and essential medicines. This led to 
inaccurate forecasts, which often resulted in insufficient supplies, 
as most medical supplies were imported. This was largely because 
of multiple supply chain systems, many of which were not cap-
tured in the national EVD inventory systems. The EVD resources, 
which were channeled through the EOC and NERC systems, 
often arrived late at the district level because of the bureaucratic 
financial and logistical management systems of both the EOC and 
NERC.
Furthermore, the EVD coordination hubs (and associated 
resources) were often not located in appropriate places. This 
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resulted in a breakdown in communication between the field 
teams and coordination hubs and delays in receiving the required 
support to the field teams. For example in Koinadugu district, 
although the epicenter of the outbreak was in Neine, a remote 
chiefdom at least 4–5 h drive from the district headquarters, the 
outbreak coordination mechanisms and resources were predomi-
nantly located at the district headquarters. This severely limited 
the initial response to the outbreak in that area.
supervision, Monitoring, and evaluation  
of evD Outbreak response interventions
The supervision, monitoring, and evaluation component of the 
EVD coordination system was observed to be weak, late into 
the outbreak response. There was no clear system for ensuring 
support supervision from national to district levels and from 
district to ward levels, to ensure that corrective action was taken 
when required. Thus it was difficult to ensure the quality of 
interventions and to rapidly identify gaps in the response effort. 
From July 2015, the NERC, supported by partners, established a 
critical monitoring team to monitor the quality of the response 
in districts reporting cases, as well as the preparedness level in 
districts that were not reporting.
cONcLUsiON
Coordination of outbreak response efforts plays a part in break-
ing the chain of transmission but will not ultimately control it 
single-handedly. Nevertheless, effective coordination of disease 
outbreak response should be an integral and critical component 
of overall outbreak control interventions (11). Effective coordina-
tion of outbreaks, such as the 2014/15 EVD outbreak, requires 
strong government leadership and ownership (12), a common 
vision, good management processes, and a shared strategy and 
priorities between all involved stakeholders.
Coordination practices during the EVD outbreak highlighted 
improvement in outbreak coordination, as the mechanism 
evolved from the EOC to the NERC (7). Our observations 
indicated that both coordination systems had some similari-
ties, advantages, and limitations. However, we believe that the 
NERC coordination mechanism was more robust as it provided 
a more effective platform for coordination of the outbreak and 
significantly contributed to its eventual control. The successes 
of the NERC system could be attributed to its executive powers 
for decision-making, human resource deployment, and fund 
disbursement. Its incident management style ensured that agreed 
actions were followed up in a timely manner, and the decision-
making process was much more efficient (13). Furthermore, the 
separation of the operational and technical components of the 
response coordination under the NERC system ensured a more 
streamlined approach to coordination, which enabled the public 
health experts to focus on their technical work.
We observed several pitfalls, common to both coordination 
frameworks (EOC and NERC), which should be avoided during 
future outbreaks. These included competition and duplication of 
efforts between the numerous coordination groups; poor com-
munication and relationships between the national and district 
coordination groups; weak and bureaucratic response compo-
nents; and inadequate logistics and supplies. Other challenges 
include slow resource mobilization and disbursement because 
of bureaucratic systems; inadequate capacity of NERC/EOC 
staff for health coordination; overtly centralized and top-heavy 
coordination; and a decision-making system that concentrated 
on Freetown and district headquarters. Our observations also 
highlighted that although UNMEER was established to enhance 
outbreak coordination, its impact was limited (6) because of its 
lack of adequate technical capacity and expertise about EVD, 
inadequate logistic capacity, and its duplication of some of the 
NERC and DERC functions. Furthermore, the body duplicated 
the functions of the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, which is an existing international organi-
zation tasked with humanitarian coordination (3, 6). This meant 
the humanitarian cluster coordination system (14), which is the 
internationally accepted framework for coordinating humanitar-
ian crises, was never formally activated during this outbreak. Our 
observations compare favorably to those of other studies, which 
reviewed coordination of emergency response interventions (3, 
6, 7, 11, 15).
We believe that early implementation of an IMS coordination 
system, such as the NERC, which is based on humanitarian cluster 
coordination principles, combined with a command and control 
style of coordination would have provided opportunities for 
better coordination of the outbreak response at the initial stages 
(16–18). This belief is premised on the successful use of IMS 
to manage the EVD outbreaks in Guinea, Liberia, and Nigeria 
with good results (7, 11, 16, 17). In Liberia, the IMS facilitated 
well organized outbreak management, clear chain of command, 
accountability, and timely follow up of actions (11, 16); similar 
benefits were also observed in Nigeria (17). However, the IMS is 
not without its pitfalls; its implementation in Sierra Leone was 
labor and capital intensive and was initially poorly understood 
by the national authorities and partners. Thus, careful planning 
and roll out of IMS is required to reduce duplication and transac-
tion costs and to ensure better civil–military cooperation and 
coordination.
recOMMeNDAtiONs
Based on our observations, we propose five recommendations to 
improve a coordinated response needed to control this type of 
disease outbreak in the future.
First, all countries should establish EOCs, with simple IMS-
based coordination mechanisms as part of outbreak preparedness 
and response efforts. Such centers should be led and maintained 
by the government (12, 19) to ensure sustainability and have 
executive decision-making powers where necessary. The centers 
should ensure clear separation between the technical and opera-
tional aspects of the outbreak coordination, facilitate adequate 
links between the various administrative levels, and ensure 
regular information sharing with streamlined outbreak informa-
tion dissemination channels to guarantee a unified system for 
information sharing. Furthermore, the quality of coordination 
meetings should be improved by good minute recording and 
putting in place appropriate mechanisms for the follow-up of 
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agreed action points. A comprehensive national inventory system 
to ensure coordinated resource mobilization and deployment is 
also imperative.
Second, decentralization of coordination systems and func-
tions to the epicenter of outbreaks, with a clear demarcation of 
roles and responsibilities between the national, districts, and local 
levels should be encouraged. The national level should focus on 
technical guidance, policy and strategy development, resource 
mobilization, and technical oversight, while the district should be 
empowered to conduct the day-to-day coordination and opera-
tion of the outbreak response.
Third, on-the-job training of all key coordination leaders to 
ensure better understanding of the coordination mechanism and 
enhance their coordination capacity is critical to enhance effective 
coordination. The content of such training should include general 
principles of health coordination, management of coordination 
meetings, strategies for identification and filling of critical gaps in 
the response, communication, conflict management, and inven-
tory/logistics management skills.
Fourth, better community engagement and participation in 
the coordination of future EVD outbreaks control is imperative. 
Modalities for ensuring better engagement of the community, 
such as conducting ongoing anthropological studies to better 
understand the community context and cultural norms should 
be prioritized.
Finally, operational researches and monitoring and 
evaluation systems are needed to better understand outbreak 
coordination dynamics and to assess the effectiveness of health 
coordination mechanisms during disease outbreak responses in 
resource constrained settings, such as in the countries affected 
by Ebola.
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